Exemplary Goods:The Product as Economic Variable by Dekker, Erwin & Kuchař, Pavel
                          Dekker, E., & Kucha, P. (2016). Exemplary Goods: The Product as
Economic Variable. Schmollers Jahrbuch, 136(3), 237-255.
https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.136.3.237
Early version, also known as pre-print
License (if available):
Unspecified
Link to published version (if available):
10.3790/schm.136.3.237
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the submitted manuscript. The final published version (version of record) is available online via Duncker
& Humblot at
https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.136.3.237 . Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms
1 
 
Exemplary Goods: The Product as Economic Variable 
Erwin Dekker 
Post-doctoral fellow F.A. Hayek 
Program at the Mercatus Center and 
Department of Economics, George 
Mason University, USA / Assistant 
Professor of Cultural Economics at 
the Erasmus School of History, 
Culture and Communication, 
Rotterdam, Netherlands 
edekker@gmu.edu / 
e.dekker@eshcc.eur.nl 
+31 10 408 2460 
 
Pavel Kuchař 
Lecturer in Economics at the 
International Business School 
Suzhou, Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool 
University, China  
pavel.kuchar@xjtlu.edu.cn 
+86(0)512 8816 1670 
Abstract: This paper offers an alternative to existing economic theories of goods, which 
conceptualize goods as bundles of objective characteristics. We present two cases of Starbucks 
and Disraeli (1929 film) to show that relevant qualities of goods – along with costs and prices – 
emerge from the process of economic competition. The properties or characteristics of goods 
should thus not be taken as given. We extend the idea that economic competition is a discovery 
procedure beyond the discovery of costs and prices to discovery of qualities offering another way 
of thinking about quality adjustments through the novel theoretical concept of exemplary goods. 
Exemplary goods, as we argue, have a coordinative role on markets that is complementary to the 
role of prices. The paper concludes with implications about the delineation of goods, and the 
emergence of markets challenging some of the current normative conclusions in the literature.  
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Exemplary Goods: The Product as Economic Variable 
Introduction 
Prices have long been accepted as the outcome of the subjective valuation of individuals. But the 
way in which goods are conceptualized in economics is still rooted in an older objective or 
essentialist view. Ever since Kelvin Lancaster conceptualized goods as combinations of objective 
characteristics, the economic theory of goods has not progressed much (Lancaster 1966; 
Lancaster 1971). In a recent paper on consumption, Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei 
Shleifer (2013), argue that goods can be analyzed as consisting of a quality independent 
component, and a quality-dependent component. The quality dependent component of the good, 
say, coffee, is what is essential to it being coffee. In their model, producers can then decide to 
add some characteristic to the basic product, in this case quality. One of the few examples in 
Lancaster’s classic work on the consumption of goods is the addition of hand lotion to washing 
detergent. The basic idea has remained the same: goods can be neatly divided up into a few basic 
characteristics. This is also the basic idea underneath the calculation of shadow prices of 
individual characteristics of goods (Rosen 1974; Epple 1987; Pakes 2003). 
One might think that this remnant of essentialism in economic theory is of relatively little 
consequence: the conceptualization of goods has never been a research priority in mainstream 
economics. But a growing number of markets, such as those for consulting services, movies, or 
dining experiences consists of goods which are all unique (Caves 2000; Karpik 2010). In such 
markets, which often rely on fine-grained distinctions between genres, origin or type of service, 
classification can make a lot of difference. More importantly, new innovative goods, services and 
experiences frequently upset traditional barriers between goods, and thus between traditional 
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categorizations of markets. Thirdly the creation of markets which were long monopolized by the 
government such as energy supply, or which have only recently been recognized as economic 
goods, such as the famous frequencies in the FCC auctions or pollution rights, or goods for 
which market mechanisms have only recently been adopted such as organs (Becker and Elías 
2007; Kuchař 2015) rely on particular conceptualizations of the good. It is of crucial importance 
to understand what is actually being traded, for these markets to function.  
A better conceptualization of goods, and the way they are perceived as similar or different by 
market participants is thus of great importance. Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013; 2016), 
building on Lancaster’s work, wrongly presume that goods are naturally part of some distinct 
market such as the market for automobiles, or the market for coffee. An implicit consequence of 
this line of thinking is that we can isolate this particular market when we conduct our analysis. 
The problem of comparing goods is consequently only half-illuminated. We get a clear sense of 
how goods within a particular market are compared to one another, but not why these goods are 
considered to be part of the same (sub)-market in the first place. A more complete theory of 
consumer choice should be equally attentive to what makes products similar, in the eyes of 
consumers. Although our alternative will introduce a more subjectivist notion of the goods, we 
do not wish to argue that the distinctions between goods are purely subjective for the individual, 
instead we contend that they are the outcome of a coordination process between producers, 
consumers and intermediaries, much like prices are the outcome of a coordination process 
between many individuals. 
This paper offers a way of thinking about quality adjustments through the novel 
theoretical concept of exemplary goods. Our argument is that just as consumers and producers 
compare relative prices, they compare relative qualities. Economists no longer believe that goods 
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have some natural value or objective price, instead, goods are thought to be priced in relation to 
other goods. We attach significance to relative prices. Yet for some reason, the majority of 
economic studies still presume that goods have objective characteristics independent of 
consumers’ judgment. We believe that thinking about (certain) existing goods as exemplars will 
shed important light upon the process of quality adjustment and, ultimately, on the emergent 
nature of classification schemes.1 Exemplary goods, we will argue, have a coordinative role on 
markets, in the same way that prices do.  
The first section will contrast the non-essentialist theory of exemplary goods with the 
essentialist theories of Lancaster and Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer. Section two presents two 
case-studies of the introduction of new exemplary goods to illustrate how the theory of 
exemplary goods sheds light on the competitive process, and more specifically, on how new 
goods come to be understood as (dis)similar. Section three generalizes our case-studies to a 
theory of market competition which incorporates competition on quality and exemplary goods. 
While we recognize that competition is a discovery process, it is not merely a discovery of costs 
and prices, but also of relevant qualities and the relations between goods. Finally, we show that 
the qualities and their meanings are mutually coordinated and discovered in the interaction 
between consumers, and producers and intermediaries.  
 
                                                 
1 The exemplary theory of judgment relies on knowledge available in markets, and is therefore a type of ecological 
rationality (V. L. Smith 2008; Gigerenzer 2008). 
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1. Essential and exemplary characteristics 
The great step forward in Lancaster’s theory of goods is to argue that goods are not single 
entities, but are instead bundles of more fundamental characteristics. Lancaster makes this point 
because he is aware that without such a theory, there is no way in which economists have 
something to say about the relationships between goods: whether they are substitutes or 
complements. Such judgments can only be a kind of common-sense knowledge, but cannot 
follow from the theory. So he proposes to think of goods as bundles of characteristics, which 
overlap between different goods.2 Goods which overlap significantly in their fundamental 
characteristics will be substitutes.  
Any good possesses an enormous number of physical properties: size, shape, color, smell, 
chemical composition, ability to perform any one of a variety of functions, and so on. Because 
not all properties will be relevant to choice, we shall henceforth use the term characteristics 
for those objective properties of things that are relevant to choice by people.” (Lancaster 1971, 
6) 
Lancaster’s fundamental insight that goods are bundles of characteristics is a great step forward 
in consumer theory. It leads directly to the theory of bundling and unbundling which deals with 
the issue of why certain characteristics would typically be sold together, while others would be 
                                                 
2 Even at the time that Lancaster proposed his theory of goods there were important criticisms available of an 
objectivist theory of goods. Edward Chamberlin recognized clearly that the variety of goods and the circumstances 
in which they are sold are infinite, thus making a delineation of some partial market highly arbitrary (Chamberlin 
1953, 9). The idea that the objective characteristics of the product could be isolated from the related services, 
information, and circumstances in which the products was sold was further criticized in the industrial organization 
literature, which at time was concerned with the ‘value’ provided or ‘waste’ generated by advertising (Goldschmid, 
Mann, and Weston 1974, chapter 3). For those authors it was clear that goods were not priced bundles of objective 
characteristics, but rather that entrepreneurs were engaged in a process of constant adjustment on multiple margins 
including price, quality, scope (bundling and unbundling of goods), advertising and whatever else might have been 
part of the product. The product, in this perspective, is itself an important economic variable (Chamberlin 1953; 
Kirzner 1973, 135–146). 
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sold separately, i.e., it highlights that one part of the competitive process is figuring out the 
relevant bundle of characteristics.3 But, Lancaster leaves us in the dark as to how do we 
determine which characteristics are bundled in a particular good and how this bundling of 
characteristics happened. What Lancaster has done is only to move the problem one level up (or 
down, depending on the perspective of the reader). It is doubtful whether we should be any more 
satisfied with the common-knowledge judgments of economists about the relations between 
goods, than we should be about similar judgments regarding the characteristics which are 
relevant to choice.  
In a recent body of work, Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2013; 2016, henceforth we refer 
to the authors as “BGS”) focus on price and quality as two alternative ‘salient’ attributes which 
determine consumer choice. There is a direct link to Lancaster’s theory of goods, the entire 
argument of BGS including the policy conclusions they draw from it, is dependent on our ability 
to identify the product characteristics relevant for consumer choice. During periods when 
‘quality’ is salient, firms will have to compete on the basis of quality, because consumers will 
overweight this attribute in their decision (BGS 2016, 482). During periods in which ‘price’ is 
salient, we will see price competition dominate. BGS argue that markets can end up in inefficient 
equilibria, for example a low-price equilibrium in which no attention is paid to improvements in 
quality. Lancaster and BGS emphasize that the quality of the good is chosen by the producer and 
known (or at least stochastically known) by the consumer. The fact that quality is chosen, based 
on the costs of producing additional quality, in effect means that market outcomes are an 
                                                 
3 In that sense there is a direct but little acknowledged line between current discussions of bundling and unbundling 
and Lancaster’s theory (James and Yellen 1976). 
7 
 
outcome of purely technological changes which impact the cost structure of a particular 
industry.4 
There is a more fundamental problem with the way in which Lancaster and BGS think of 
goods. By fixing the characteristics which make up a product, or at least those which are relevant 
to consumer choice, they create an essentialist notion of what the good in question is. The 
consequence of this is that they create a kind of natural map of markets: the market for fast food, 
the market for budget air travel, the market for financial services and the market for fashion (to 
name two which BGS associate with the ‘price’ salience and two which they associate with the 
‘quality’ salience). Not only do they neglect the way in which these market became coherent 
markets in the first place, they also fix what the product being traded in these market is. 
Consequently, when BGS (2016) analyze the entrance of Starbucks into the coffee market, they 
have to interpret this as an instance of Starbucks competing with (cheap) home-brew coffee, 
rather than as a quite fundamental change in the good, or the introduction of a good which upsets 
current categorizations. We contend that any convincing account of the introduction of Starbucks 
will have to take into account that the company contributed to a radical transformation of 
characteristics that were relevant to consumer choice, that is, the company managed to induce the 
alteration of the way in which the product was understood and categorized by consumers.   
To develop an alternative to this essentialist theory of goods, we propose a theory of 
exemplary goods. What exemplars are and how they are used by individuals to make judgments, 
is developed in Hannah Arendt’s theory of exemplary validity. Her theory of exemplary 
                                                 
4 This line of reasoning merely falls back into an old fallacy, which in the 1970’s surrounded the failed attempts by 
critics of advertising to distinguish between production costs and selling costs. A distinction rightly criticized by 
Harold Demsetz (1964; 1968), Yale Brozen (1974) and Israel Kirzner (1973, chap. 4) 
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reasoning is explicitly developed as a critique of essentialist notions of categories. Consider a 
table, she argues, we could have in mind an essential list of characteristics to which every table 
must conform to qualify as a table, if we then meet an object we can determine whether it fits the 
requirements. Does it have a flat top surface? Does it stand on legs? Does it have the correct 
height, etc.? Economists following Lancaster tend to use this kind of laundry-list approach when 
they think of markets for goods as well-defined entities. The exemplary mode of reasoning on 
the other hand: “thinks of some table as the example of how tables actually should be: the 
exemplary table. This exemplar is and remains a particular that in its very particularity reveals 
the generality that otherwise could not be defined” (Arendt 1982, 72). In this exemplary sense 
we use the particular to illustrate the general, in Arendt’s words, we say for example that to be 
courageous is to be like Achilles. 
Arendt argues that thinking in terms of exemplars is “the faculty of thinking the particular” 
(Arendt 1982, 76). Pure thinking for Arendt is thinking in the general, it is thinking in rules, 
laws, regularities, and categories.5 To judge, on the other hand, is to consider the particular in 
light of some category, while keeping in mind the uniqueness of the particular. Occasionally we 
will find particular instances which we cannot yet relate to some existing category, and then we 
have to consider the particular in light of other particulars. When a new good is thus introduced 
on the market it is judged in relation to known exemplars, rather than fitted in a particular 
category6. Home-brewed coffee, or a particular brand of it, is one exemplar that will be relevant, 
but so will other neighboring exemplars as we will demonstrate below.  
                                                 
5 See also Hayek ([1968] 1978) on the primacy of the abstract. 
6 A good is not exemplary unless it manages to coordinate expectations about how one is supposed to act with 
regard to the good in question. This coordination of expectations takes place through contestation; exemplars 
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Theorists of exemplars emphasize the gradedness of categories (Mervis and Rosch 1981; 
Barsalou 1985).7 Gradedness of categories means that not every member is an equally good 
example of a particular category. ‘Robins’, for example, are consistently considered to be 
exemplary birds, but penguins far less so (they seem to be closer to some exemplary fish). Such 
exemplars are learned faster by children, and play a crucial role in category formation (Lynch, 
Coley, and Medin 2000). One might think that exemplars represent a central tendency in the 
category: a bird has wings, feathers, and a beak, it is relatively small and it flies, features which 
the robin matches better than the penguin. But more recent studies have distinguished between a 
typical (central) instance and an exemplary instance. These sometimes overlap, but particularly 
when a notion of goodness is involved, as is the case for market goods, the exemplary tends to be 
close to some ideal, and thus far from the typical or central (Barsalou 1985; Lynch, Coley, and 
Medin 2000; Burnett et al. 2005).8  
Exemplary goods are goods (or services) that are successful and therefore are imitated by 
competitors.9 The iPhone has been an exemplary smartphone for a while, in the same way that 
                                                 
emerge as solutions to social conflicts. In this sense, the meaning of exemplars is (at least potentially) always 
contested. Furthermore, exemplars can be seen as ontologically autonomous social media or focal public 
representations that “induce” certain beliefs and expectations, they are signs that induce dispositions to see the world 
and act on it in a particular way (cf. Aoki 2011; Hermann-Pillath 2016). 
7 Some of the early authors on exemplars noted the connection with family resemblances as described by 
Wittgenstein (Rosch and Mervis, 1975). 
8 BGS instead rely on a simple average of the characteristics for their definition of the reference good: “the choice 
context is summarized by a reference good (…) where the reference or normal levels of quality and price are 
their average values” (BGS 2013, 820). In a paper critical of the characteristics definition of goods Steven Payson 
(1995) develops the notion of the ‘representative good’, but he relies on the median product in the market.  
9 An exemplar is, as an old definition has it: “a pattern; an example to be imitated” (Needham 1985). 
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say Harvard and Cambridge are exemplary universities. These goods, or sometimes brands, teach 
us about something about the characteristics and qualities of a category of goods, even when we 
cannot always fully describe or articulate what that quality consists of. Exemplary goods and 
practices contain tacit knowledge about the dos and don’ts that is often hard to codify (Polanyi 
1958). What a modern university is and whether it is different from a college, a think-tank or a 
19th century university, has been discovered through the course of time. Neither the relevant 
characteristics, nor the way in which universities are compared, nor the relationship of this 
particular category of goods to other categories has remained unchanged. Initial smartphones 
were closer to traditional mobile phones, but more recent versions have moved closer to tablet, 
computers and sometimes even TV sets. 
Just like the prices and costs cannot be treated as fixed in the process of economic 
competition, so specific markets, and categories of goods cannot be treated as fixed for any more 
than short periods of time. As Chamberlin argues: “Products are not in fact ‘given’, they are 
continuously changed – improved, deteriorated, or just made different – as an essential part of 
the market process” (Chamberlin 1953, 3). And since the offered product constantly shifts, the 
relationships between products, their cross-price elasticities if you wish, also changes.10 A theory 
of exemplary goods allows us to leave behind essentialist notions of what a table, a coffee, or a 
university is, and to treat the relevant characteristics of these goods as something which is 
discovered in the process of competition (Hayek [1968] 2002). Exemplary goods make us 
recognize that categories are formed around particular, exemplary instances. This is the case, for 
                                                 
10 One important consequence of the constant change in products is that “The conception of the economic system as 
divisible into distinct markets for separate commodities is after all very largely the product of the imagination of the 
economist” (Hayek 1948, 98). 
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example, for categories named after their exemplary instance: baby’s onesies, jeans, the jacuzzi, 
and the jeep. Secondly, exemplars emphasize that although some instances might be a perfect fit 
in a category, others are border-line cases, which do not fit current categories well (Zuckerman 
1999; Kennedy, Lo, and Lounsbury 2010). Thirdly, exemplars are able to capture the market 
dynamic in which particular products are placed within a category, but are also represented as 
standing out from that category. This use of the exemplary is particularly visible in 
advertisements in which the uniqueness of the particular product is emphasized against the 
shared qualities of other products (“this is not just food, but M&S food” as one slogan has it).  
2. Starbucks, Disraeli and the source of commercial success 
We present two illustrative case studies here to analyze the role of exemplary goods as focal 
points in market competition, and their role in the formation of categories. The first is an 
alternative interpretation of the Starbucks story as presented by BGS (2016), and the second one 
discusses the emergence of the biopic genre in film, and draws on the work of Rick Altman 
(1999).   
a. Starbucks 
To illustrate their theory of salient characteristics BGS use the case of Starbucks coffee. The 
argument goes that Starbucks was successful in making quality, rather than price salient, and 
consequently the industry shifted from cost-reductions to offering superior quality. The case-
study is illustrative of the idea that there are distinct markets in the economy in which 
competition takes place. When Starbucks opened up its café-style shops 1987 to sell high-quality 
espresso-drinks to a mass market they were quickly successful and by 2000 Starbucks had 
expanded to 3,500 stores, and to over 11,000 in 2010. The authors argue that Starbucks was 
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competing in the market for coffee, with home-brewed coffee and other restaurants which 
offered coffee. It would be silly to deny this, but by focusing on the product of coffee alone we 
fail to understand what Starbucks managed to achieve. According to BGS, Starbucks merely 
found “a profitable way to sell espresso drinks for the mass market, by providing consistently 
high quality delivered by trained baristas” (BGS 2016, 500).  
But even BGS have to observe that Starbucks also changed the atmosphere in which coffee 
was consumed, that it offered a wider range of coffees, to which we could add that they sell a 
range of complimentary snacks and cakes, that they provide Wi-Fi and comfortable chairs, that 
they used alternative marketing techniques, that they personalized service, that they greatly 
expanded the range of drinks on offer, even for those who do not particularly like coffee, etc. In 
terms of exemplars, they managed to introduce a new good, that can still be compared to (and 
hence compete with) home-brewed coffee, but which also could now be related to the pastries 
offered in bakeries, and to the social function of cafes, restaurants and even libraries. In fact, 
Starbucks started the trend to serve as an alternative office space for self-employed workers and 
writers (Woldoff et al. 2013). BGS (2016, 501) speak of a ‘Starbucks effect’ that they observe on 
the quality of coffee beans offered in the supermarket, but a similar effect (in different 
incarnations) might have taken place in bakeries, in cafes and restaurants, as well as in libraries 
and in the office world, and we of course know it has. 
So when BGS claim that the ‘Starbucks effect’ “results from Starbucks’ introduction of a 
different technology that allowed it to offer much higher and salient quality,” this grossly 
misrepresents what has happened in the market. Their claim does not specify what is of much 
higher quality (the chairs perhaps?) as what Starbucks did is not similar to a change in harvesting 
techniques which would lower the costs of high quality beans. But it was precisely the ‘what’, 
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the product, that changed through their innovation. The product and the way it was understood 
by consumers, and hence how it was valued was the key aspect that changed. BGS provide some 
evidence that the total quantity of coffee remains unchanged to make the argument that 
Starbucks managed to replace the yesteryear’s low-quality coffee. But the constant quantity now 
bought at a much higher price if clear evidence of anything, is that consumer valuation of the 
good in question changed. Even that, if our story is correct, would not be completely accurate, 
however. There is no market for coffee with fixed boundaries. Starbucks introduced a good that 
would soon become exemplary, a new focal point to which other producers soon gravitated 
altering the boundaries between markets.  
The consequence of this alternative interpretation is that the normative conclusions that BGS 
draw from this story and their general theory no longer hold. They argue that the introduction of 
‘Starbucks’ was “causing a reduction in the price sensitivity of all consumers” (BGS 2016, 501). 
With the implication that consumers had been wrong before, they focused too much on price. In 
our alternative interpretation of exemplary goods, to the contrary, a new good is introduced 
which opens up new opportunities not just for producers, but also for consumers who adjust their 
behavior accordingly. That is, we do not have to posit a sudden shift in the price sensitivity of all 
‘coffee’ consumers. Instead, the theory of exemplary goods allow us to recognize that new 
goods, and relevant characteristics, or qualities, are discovered in the market process. The price-
focused consumers in the pre-Starbucks world were only wrong if Starbucks were merely a new 
combination of existing characteristics. Then we can say that they were too focused on the 
salient quality of price.11 But if we instead recognize that new relevant characteristics (or 
                                                 
11 An additional problem with the theory is that a switch back to price being the salient characteristic is hard to 
imagine, unless we now start to think of ‘Starbucks’-type coffee as the basic product around which fierce price-
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qualities) and new products are discovered in the competitive process, then consumers were in 
fact learning about new alternatives. In such an open-ended world saying that price-focused 
coffee consumers were wrong before, is like saying that consumers were too focused on the 
prices of hand-held calculators before the PC was introduced.  
b. Disraeli (1929) and the birth of biopic 
This second illustrative case further explains what the implications of an open-ended discovery 
process of the market are. It demonstrates how qualities are discovered in the interaction between 
consumers, producers and intermediaries. In this process, exemplary goods are crucial. This 
case-study is based on Rick Altman’s book Film/Genre (1999) and particularly on his story of 
the emergence of the biopic, a movie genre in which the life of a historical figure is narrated.  
In the movie industry, the producer’s job is forward looking in nature. The producer can 
identify successful films, but he does not know with any certainty what has made these films 
successful. Instead he engages in a process of trial and error based on past successes. The critic’s 
job, on the other hand, is backward looking in nature: she evaluates films in hindsight. So if the 
critic wants to write the history of a genre such as the Spaghetti Western, she can assess all the 
films that are said to belong to that genre, from which she can form a general description of the 
genre. As such the critic, argues Altman, is with the benefit of hindsight able to use an 
                                                 
competition takes place. In the BGS story this would be a highly artificial move, but in the theory of exemplary 
goods, it is natural to expect that after a new exemplary good has established itself on the market, that competitors 
will offer similar products and compete on price or any other relevant margin. In that sense, our theory is in line with 
the way that Schumpeter talked about the temporary monopoly that the innovative firm could establish (Schumpeter 
1961).  
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essentialist notion of a genre. But the producer (nor the consumer for that matter) does not have 
this knowledge, and is instead finding his way through with help of the currently existing 
exemplary goods.  
When Warner Bros. produced the film Disraeli, about the British politician and author, they 
thought they were ‘simply’ adapting a successful musical and earlier silent film into a new film. 
And indeed, the film, released in 1929, starring George Arliss (who had also played the lead role 
in the silent film and the musical) went on to become a great worldwide commercial success. It 
attracted around 170 million viewers in 29,000 theaters over the following years. Warner Bros. 
and other film studios were therefore eager to go on imitating its success. But this posed the 
problem of figuring out what had made the film so successful in the first place:  
What does the film have that might be worth imitating? In 1929, Warner Bros. saw Disraeli 
not as a biopic – a non-existent category at the time – but as a film whose success was due to 
its primary emphasis on British history, political intrigue and international strife, with 
secondary attention to financial concerns, Jewishness and expansive speech-making, plus 
perhaps a nod to director Alfred E. Green and the film’s stage-play source. (Altman 1999, 40) 
Shortly after the success of Disraeli, Warner Bros. produced three other ‘British’ films, The 
Green Goddess (1930, starring Arliss), the more comedic The Man from Blankley’s (1930), and 
Sweet Kitty Bellairs (1930, directed by Green). All three films were based on earlier stage plays 
or musicals, but the success of Disraeli was unmatched. Warner Bros. then attempted to drop the 
musical and romantic aspects in favor of more financial and Victorian subject matter in Old 
English (1930, with Arliss and directed by Green). Unlike the preceding three flops, this film 
turned out to be a success soon to be followed up by another financial adventure, called The 
Millionaire (1931, starring Arliss). Soon after came Alexander Hamilton (starring Arliss), a film 
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without the British flavor, but with the political intrigue and the biographic treatment of one 
character.  
Alexander Hamilton turned out to be a great success. As Altman makes clear, in retrospect it 
is easy to see the similarities between Disraeli to Alexander Hamilton, and recognize them as 
early examples of the biopic. But that is only when we have the benefit of hindsight, the 
perspective of the critic, and a clear notion of what the genre is, which allows us to recognize 
them as similar. The forward looking producer instead is engaged in a trial-and-error in which 
various characteristics and qualities are combined, and in which the end point is uncertain. As 
the iterations in this case made clear, Disraeli could have started a genre of Victorian films, or of 
financial adventure films, but those genres never materialized. Instead Disraeli came to be 
considered the first biopic.  
During the trial-and-error process in which the producer was engaged this was not at all clear. 
Alexander Hamilton was not marketed at all by Warner Bros. as a kind of sequel to Disraeli. 
Instead it was presented as an American historical movie, one that notably included a scandalous 
affair. And that was indeed how Warner Bros. followed up the success of Alexander Hamilton. 
So as Altman concludes: “not even the simplest description of a film holds up throughout the 
game, because each new film undermines our previous understanding” (Altman 1999, 41). The 
relevant characteristics for consumer choice were not known to the producers, they only became 
apparent in the competitive market process.  
In this competitive market process exemplary goods are important, they are the goods which 
are imitated by producers. But only after various iterations does it become clear what 
combination of characteristics are valued by consumers, and how they fit together, or in other 
words how they form a genre or a market category. Disraeli as a film has an enormous amount 
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of interdependent characteristics, so the question remains: What are the qualities that should be 
imitated and in what combinations? As Altman argues: “the [biopic] genre was not created until 
multiple studios, repeatedly replicated specific biographical elements of earlier films” (Altman 
1999, 43). In the film market, like in many other markets, intermediaries are an important factor 
in making sense of these new products, in linking them together.12 This process of emergence is 
central in the further development of the theory of exemplary goods.  
3. The discovery of focal qualities through exemplary goods 
The competitive process of markets is widely believed to be a good way of finding the most 
efficient way of minimizing costs, and of discovering the price which clears the market. But as 
we can see in the case of Starbucks and Disraeli, this is not the whole story. Competition is not 
just a price-quantity discovering procedure, it is also a process through which the relevant 
characteristics and their combinations are discovered. The two illustrative cases demonstrate that 
the relevant characteristics of the good were not fixed throughout the process of market 
competition, rather, they were discovered. In the process of competition, the categorization of the 
product changed, as is clearest in the film example. Although the producer marketed Disraeli as 
a new version of an earlier silent film and musical, in the end the movie came to be understood 
as an early and exemplary instance of a biopic. In the Starbucks case, too, we have argued that 
the change is better understood as an introduction of a new type of good, whose relation to 
existing products was not instantly clear. One way of interpreting and marketing the good is as 
higher quality coffee, the BGS (2016) interpretation. But it could equally be interpreted as an 
                                                 
12 In film reviews for example, comparisons are frequently drawn between particular exemplary films. This is the 
most tastefully, subtly designed Japanese film since the memorable “Gate of Hell” (Dekker 2017). 
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instance of more variety, better service or superior ambiance. The former interpretation would 
mean that the product category of coffee remains more or less the same, the latter interpretation 
means that the product had been fundamentally changed in the evolutionary process of 
competition.  
Existing economic theories which rely on an essentialist notion of goods are unable to 
capture this product evolution (Payson 1995). They have to argue that all of these goods are part 
of some fixed product category. Our theory of exemplary goods, on the other hand, emphasizes 
that the relevant characteristics and, above all, the relationship of these characteristics to other 
goods are discovered in the competitive process. What occurs is a trial-and-error process of 
newly introduced goods that typically fail to catch on. Only every now and then a new good 
succeeds on the market, when this occurs, the good might be interpreted and hence categorized 
and marketed as a slight variation of some existing (exemplary) good. Occasionally, however, 
firms introduce goods that challenge, or are perceived by consumers to challenge the existing 
market categories or shared understandings of the good. These goods, when imitated, will 
become new exemplary goods; they will alter the way that existing categories are graded, i.e. 
they will make characteristics which were previously thought to be of minor importance focal, 
and formerly focal characteristics will become less relevant. The new exemplar might also 
challenge the boundaries between existing market categories. Finally, the challenge of existing 
market categories might result in the emergence of new categories.  
Edward Chamberlin stressed the emergent product variation lamenting the deluded economist 
who has perhaps “been blinded” by “a system of thought which takes products as data and hence 
does not even raise the question of how they are determined” (Chamberlin 1953). But the issue 
also repeatedly appears throughout the works of Friedrich Hayek, who points out that economic 
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calculus – “the logic of choice” – takes the “apparatus of classification of possible human 
attitudes” for granted (Hayek 1948, 93).13  Although both Chamberlin and Hayek recognized that 
the emergence of classifications is a central issue of economic competition, they are not very 
specific about how classification takes place, either.14 We argue that the notion of exemplary 
goods is a significant step forward in the study of the competition process, but to avoid confusion 
we should further specify how exemplary goods fulfill this function. With this discussion we 
conclude our argument. 
In the Lancaster framework, which still dominates most studies of quality in economics, 
producers choose the level of quality or the characteristics of goods. As a consequence, 
uncertainty about the goods asymmetrical, the producer knows, but the consumer is in the dark, 
and potential for exploitation of this uncertainty exists (Lupton 2005). In other words, firms 
“‘frame’ competition by focusing consumers’ attention on their best attribute (quality or price)” 
(BGS 2016, 481). 
There are at least two alternative ways in which new exemplary goods, and their relevant 
characteristics may take shape. First, one might suggest symmetric variation of the standard 
model and argue that whether a new good – although introduced by producers in a trial-and-error 
process – will become exemplary, is ultimately determined by consumers. After all, consumers 
                                                 
13 Instead of taking assuming the existence of this network of focal exemplars and their mutual relationships, 
Hayek calls our attention to “the real problem” which seems to be “not whether we will get given commodities or 
services at given marginal costs but mainly by what commodities and services the needs of the people can be most 
cheaply satisfied” (Hayek 1948, 100–101). We cannot proceed assuming “a ‘given’ quantity of scarce goods”, the 
question of “which things are goods ... is precisely one of the conditions that competition should discover” (Hayek 
[1968] 2002, italics ours).  
14 Hayek ([1969] 1978) discusses the process of classification in terms of neuronal group selection. 
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pursue certain goals, and will seek the goods which help them best fulfill these goals. This 
approach lies at the heart of the alternative approach to consumer theory developed by Robert 
Michael and Gary Becker (Michael and Becker 1973; see also Stigler and Becker 1977). In their 
approach households seek to produce a fixed set of ‘commodities’, for which consumer goods 
are inputs (Foodstocks for example, are the input into the production of health). But while 
Lancaster fixes the essential characteristics of a good, this alternative Chicago approach has to 
fix the ‘commodities’ which households produce, and thus remain equally essentialist. 
The second alternative takes into account the role of an agency that regulates quality. These 
agencies or regulators might take the quality determining process in their hands and, as 
Chamberlin points out, reduce the heterogeneity of qualitative characteristics by means of 
“standards and grades … promulgated [for example] by the Federal government” (Chamberlin 
1953). Alvin Roth (2015) wrote about the case of the US market in wheat that used to be 
characterized by much uncertainty about quality and provenance of the wheat. That is, until the 
Chicago Board of Trade implemented a uniform grading system in 1848. At that point the 
commodification of wheat, in the sense of the creation a set of rules that made a product 
standardized, thickened the market, and cut down on a variety of transaction costs. It was this 
particular categorization of wheat that was necessary for the commodification of grain that 
allowed large scale impersonal transfers in this good (Roth 2015, 16). In fact, Roth often quips 
that while God made wheat, it was the Chicago Board of Trade made the No. 2 Hard Red Winter 
(the set of rules that turned wheat into a more homogeneous commodity). This implies that it is 
not just the firm that can choose and implement the (efficient) focal qualities of their goods 
around which categories and classification schemes are built. In fact, a regulator such as a Board 
of Trade or a Federal government can choose. Acknowledging that setting standards of quality 
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might fall beyond the scope of the firm decision making is a major step ahead in the theory of 
consumer choice, it recognizes the importance of coordination between buyers and sellers. But 
Roth, focused on matching markets as he is, fails to consider why this grading system was 
accepted by buyers and sellers as legitimate in this particular instance, or indeed why in other 
instances we do not see more standardization, but instead more differentiation.  
In other words, Roth fails to analyze the process by which such coordination comes about. 
Why are particular standards adopted? And why are particular differentiations successful? 
Although our theory of exemplary goods does not provide a way of identifying beforehand 
which goods will be exemplary, it does give insight into the way in which particular goods are 
linked together, and how firms and consumers understand similarities and differences between 
goods. As Barbara Smith argues in a different context: 
Not only are the objects we encounter always to some extent pre-interpreted and preclassified 
for us by our particular cultures and languages, but also pre-evaluated, bearing the marks and 
signs of their prior valuings and evaluations by our fellow creatures. Indeed, preclassification 
is itself a form of preevaluation, for the labels or category names under which we encounter 
objects not only, as was suggested earlier, foreground certain of their possible functions but 
also operate as signs—in effect, as culturally certified endorsements—of their more or less 
effective performance of those functions. (B. H. Smith 1983, 23)    
What matters for understanding people’s choices in different situations – such as buying a 
beer in a beach resort as opposed to getting it from a corner store – is thus not the fact that one 
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buys a beer both times, as BGS emphasize, but rather the understanding by consumers of these 
situations.15  
We have argued that competition is above all a process of opinion formation. While this 
argument recognizes that competition is a discovery procedure, it is not merely a discovery of 
costs and prices. This understanding is valuable but it takes an important part of the discovery 
procedure for granted. Ex ante, costs of doing things are not simply out there for the analyst – or 
an agent – to access and process. In the same way, the social categories that often seem solid and 
robust are in fact not given either, they have to be created too. In our particular cases, to take the 
market for coffee or biopic film-genre for granted is to confuse what is known ex-post, with what 
was uncertain ex ante.  
We have shown that the existing structure of categories often obscures the acts of 
entrepreneurship that have contributed to the fine-grained differentiation that modern markets 
rely on. These acts of entrepreneurship do not just introduce new products to us, but also the way 
in which we should understand them. In this process of mutual coordination, the entrepreneurial 
actions of producers and consumers play an important role and it is in the interaction between 
consumers and producers that meanings are mutually coordinated so that some of them become 
focal, in other words, exemplary.16 The market process is a discovery process, at least in the very 
                                                 
15 The situations we encounter are very often pre-classified or pre-evaluated through the linguistic conventions that 
we use. These conventions “indicate how one ought to respond to such circumstances”, in other words, “categories 
provide ‘instruction[s] for practice’” (Lewis 2016; Shackle 1992).  
16 Additionally, in many markets intermediaries of a wide variety, critics, marketers, early adopters, promoters and 
the like, play a prime role in the mediation of this discovery process (Bessy and Marie Chauvin 2013). 
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real sense, that knowledge of costs, prices and focal qualities around which categories of goods 
emerge becomes available.17  
Conclusion 
Competition is not just a price-quantity discovering procedure through which resources are 
allocated to their most efficient uses. While competition is a discovery process, it is not merely a 
discovery of costs and prices; we argue that besides prices, relevant qualities of goods emerge 
from the competitive process as well. We further argue that qualities and their meanings are 
mutually coordinated and discovered in the interaction between consumers, producers, and 
intermediaries.  
Our thesis offers an alternative to essentialist theories that assume goods belong to fixed 
product categories. We believe that a theory of goods that takes exemplars into account is more 
realistic with regard to the relevant factors that should be explained. The conceptual difference 
between essentialist and exemplary theories challenge the way in which economists generally 
distinguish between different goods and markets. Second, we challenge the way in which quality 
is usually considered in economic models where producers choose the level of quality (based on 
cost-functions). Producers neither have the power nor the knowledge to do so. Rather, producers 
– like consumers – are engaged in discovering the relevant characteristics and qualities of the 
good, which primarily emerge from the competitive process. Exemplars, a novel theoretical 
                                                 
17 Or as Richard Langlois and Metin Cosgel argue: “the economic problem of production becomes a coordination 
problem: discovering – or, rather, helping to create – an interpersonally shared structure of transaction” (Langlois and 
Cosgel 1998, 112). 
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concept we introduce here, play a crucial role in economic competition through which quality 
categories emerge. 
Working with a salience model that operates with attention externalities (Bordalo, Gennaioli 
and Shleifer 2016), one needs to presume that all relevant characteristics are already known to 
both the consumer and the producer so as to conclude that consumers somehow make wrong 
decisions. If, on the other hand, we adopt the model of exemplary goods, with its associated 
ecological rationality, we can see that producers and consumers create and discover new relevant 
qualities and adjust their behavior accordingly.  
We illustrated the process by which this happens with two case-studies. These cases clearly 
show that the relevant knowledge for improved decision-making by producers and consumers 
emerges in the competitive process. Biopics, as well as the new product offered by Starbucks, 
had not existed beforehand, so to argue that producers were foolish not to offer these products, or 
consumers for not demanding them, is essentially blaming them for today’s failure to possess 
tomorrow’s knowledge (Buchanan and Vanberg 1991). The problem is that tomorrow’s 
knowledge is open ended and it is only with the benefit of hindsight, that is with knowledge 
which will have been created in the competitive process, that we can see whether the decisions 
made were optimal or not.  
We invite further research into the problem of non-price coordination. How do entrepreneurs 
who break focal expectations contribute to the formation and emergence of new exemplars and 
classification schemes? How does innovation upset existing classification schemes and 
traditional boundaries between market categories? We believe that the theory of exemplars will 
help us better understand how markets emerge by answering the question of what is actually 
being traded. What the good is should no longer be taken for granted.  
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